Coast Florida Health in Insurance Low

Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. Conventional theory also holds that any additional health care that people purchase when they are insured is of such low value that it is not worth the costs of providing it. As a result, economists have promoted policies, such as cost sharing and managed care, to reduce consumption of this "low-value" care. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for heath insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill. In effect, insurance companies take the premiums paid by those who remain relatively healthy and transfer them to those who come down with a serious disease. This additional income often allows sick persons to obtain medical care that they may not otherwise be able to afford. The value of health insurance, therefore, stems largely from the value of the additional health care that insurance makes possible, and has little, if anything, to do with preferences for certainty. Because its value lies largely in providing access to necessary health care, health insurance is held to be much more valuable under the new theory than the old. The new theory also implies that cost sharing and managed care -- central health policies of the last 30 years -- were largely directed at solving problems that did not exist. Because these policies either reduced the "income" transferred to ill persons or limited access to additional health care, they may have done more harm than good. The new theory suggests that insurancecoverage should be extended to the uninsured. It also provides a solid theoretical justification for implementing some form of national health insurance. The new theory emphasizes three constraints.

This book considers the effectiveness of insurance coverage for low-probability, high-consequence events such as natural disasters -- and how insurance programs can successfully be used with other policy tools, such as building codes and standards, to encourage effective loss reduction measures. The authors discuss the reasons for the dramatic increase since 1989 in insured losses from natural disasters and the concern that insurers have about their ability to provide coverage against more such events in the future. The book addresses why there has been an increasing demand for hazard insurance, what types of coverage private insurers are willing to offer, and the role of reinsurance and private/public-sector initiatives at the state and federal levels for providing protection to victims of natural disasters. Detailed case studies of the challenges facing Florida in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and California following the Northridge earthquake in 1994 reveal the challenges facing the insurance industry as well as other concerned stakeholders. The National Flood Insurance Program illustrates how a public/private-sector partnership can mitigate damages and provide financial protection to victims. This volume identifies new initiatives for reducing future losses and providing funds for recovery through cooperation by the relevant parties.